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Cromley: The Right to Dissent in a Free Society

THE RIGHT TO DISSENT IN A FREE SOCIETY
Brent R. Cromley*
Observatiun: In the meaning which the expression has for most
of us, a "free society" suggests the incorporation of a right to
dissent from the viewpoint of the majority. Yet, if the free society is
organized upon a system of laws as the foundation, there cannot
exist a "right" to disobey the law: a toleration of a general right to
disobey would obviously undermine the legal foundation.
The initiation of a discussion of the right to dissent was a reference
to disobedience of the law is not an inherent necessity, nor even a logical
step. Today, however, our society is so involved with examination and
definition of the right to dissent and the "non-right" to dissent, that one
cannot consider with any significance the former without considering the
latter. The latter is generally called civil disobedience.
This article examines, first and primarily, the right to dissent in a
free society. When dissent extends beyond that right and involves a violation of law, the dissent is at least civil disobedience, if not treason, civil
rebellion, or revolution. It is advantageous to here set out a workable
definition of "civil disobedience". It will be useful first in considering
civil disobedience as the limitation of the right to dissent. Later, the
definition will be referred to when this article cites justifications which
writers have urged for civil disobedience. These justifications, in effect,
attempt to embrace various forms of civil disobedience within the right
to dissent.
"'Civil disobedience is the deliberate breaking of law in order to
secure a change in the legal system."'
The foregoing definition by Conrad Lynn, a leading advocate of
Black Power and civil disobedience, is a remarkably simple one when one
considers that many writers have written entire articles examining only
definitions of civil disobedience. But until we come back to discuss civil
disobedience itself and to determine (or at least raise the question) whether
there can be moral authorization to disobey the law, Lynn's definition
will suffice to distinguish civil disobedience from the legal "right" to
dissent.
Prior to the current wave of literature on political and social dissent, most lawyers would naturally associate the word "dissent" with the
type of action taken so many time by the late Supreme Court Justice
Oliver Wendell Holmes, so-called the "great dissenter". The association
is a good one, because the right of a justice or appellate judge to articulate
his opinions contrary to the majority of justices or judges is one of the

*Member of the Montana Bar. A.B., Dartmouth College, 1963; J.D., University
of Montana, 1968
'Lynn, We Must Disobey! 43 N.Y.U.L. REV. 648, 649 (1968).
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oldest and most valuable rights of dissent.2 The dissenting opinions of
several Supreme Court Justices, notably those of Justice Holmes, have
eventually been applied to frame a majority Supreme Court opinion. An
act of Congress, on its face unconstitutional, has recently been passed
on the presumption that the four dissenting justices in Miranda v. Arizona
will ultimately be joined by other justices with a similar conviction.8
While the right to dissent is necessarily limited by our laws, the
right is guaranteed to the members of this free society by the Constitution
of the United States. That document does not mention "dissent" by name,
but the declaration there is strikingly similar to the concept of dissent
which is in vogue today:
Congress shall make no law .

.

. abridging the freedom of speech,

or of the press; or of the right of the people peaceably to assemble,
and to petition the Government for a redress of grievences.'
An historian could probably statistically prove to us that at no
time in history have so many people on earth enjoyed the right to publicly
express opinions as do the same three billion persons living on it today.
But the fact is, that in many areas of the globe the thought expressed in
the First Amendment would still seem so radical as to be almost comical.
Obviously, if "freedom" is interpreted as meaning an unlimited
right, the First Amendment does not mean what it says. No one will contend that the authors of the Constitution intended that there could never
be a law against falsely shouting "fire" in a crowded theatre. 5 The
dilemma is that the Constitution grants the apparently unlimited freedoms
while we as a Qociety of many millions could not survive if all had these
unlimited freedoms. The resolution of the dilemma comes in limiting the
freedoms granted in the First Amendment to the point at which exercise
of a freedom interferes with another's exercise of his freedom.
Lawrence W. O'Brien expressed this limitation on constitutional freedoms with regard to dissent very succinctly:
Dissent in our society is a right which we all enjoy. If you dissent
by writing or speaking, there must be no penalties-as long as the
laws of libel and slander are not broken.

If you dissent by action, such as picketing or marching, there must
be no penalties, as long as you do not injure my right to move about
freely.
If you dissent by breaking the law, then you must expect to pay
the consequences."

2

Georgia v. Brailsford, 2 U.S. 402 (1792), was apparently the first opinion of substantive law issued by the Supreme Court of the United States. Justices William

Cushing and Thomas Johnson dissented.
'See S. REP. No. 1097 (Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968), 90th

Cong., 2d Sess. (1968), as set out in 2 U.S.C.

CONG.

& AD. NEws (1968) 2112, 2138.

'U.S. CONST. amend. I.
v. United States, 249 U.S. 47, 52 (1919).
'Schenck
6
QO'Brien, The Dissenter: The Purpose of the Polls, 34 VITAL SPEECHES OF THE DAY,
231, 233 (1968).
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In 99.9 per cent of the occasions in which the right to dissent is
exercised, no one gets very upset. We dissent by shopping at a store other
that the one in which we have had poor service. We dissent by being cool
toward an acquaintance who has done a thing we consider wrong. This
is not the type of dissent with which we are now concerned. This is not
the dissent to which Professor Daniel Boorstin of the University of Chicago
refers when he says that dissent is "the great problem of America
7
today".
But when a substantial body of aroused citizens-albeit a minority
of the public as a whole-parades and sings through a courthouse yard,
or sits-in at a Selective Service induction center, or carries placards and
banners through Main Street on the occasion of a visit by a public dignitary,
people do get upset, and are moved.
There are several reasons why such activity causes such a great impact on public thought. First, is the gravity of the thought being expressed by the dissenters. If a group of university students were to congregate to protest the quality of food served at their institution, the only
reaction from most members of the public would probably be amusement.
Even a picket line of employees parading past a restaurant to protesl
low wages does not evoke much concern, though many people may avoid
eating at the restaurant because of the picket line. But when an organization is formed to protest America's involvement in Southeast Asia, it
still rates front page coverage locally, and perhaps nationally. People
talk about such a protest, and carefully observe.
A second reason why some occasions of dissent stand out from most
trivial examples of dissent is sheer quantity of people. One person booing
a speech by a public official can be ignored or escorted quietly out of the
hall; a thousand persons cannot be. A third reason is that the dissent
with which the nation is concerned today is not the type of dissent which
is merely printed and distributed for us to read or lay aside at our
leisure. The dissent which is making the news and causing people to reconsider the extent to which freedom of dissent should be permitted is the
dissent which "comes on like gangbusters". Even the very least aware
persons do not ignore an assembly of hundreds marching peaceable
through the streets to declare that, no matter what their color, all persons
are deserving cf equal rights.
Besides the gravity of the subject, the quantity of the people, and
the physical iqpact of the expression, there may be other reasons why
some dissent has a greater influence. The logic of the expression, the
status of the dissenters, and the publicity given the dissent may contribute
to, or subtract from, the ultimate effect upon people's opinions.
Before attempting to describe limits or definitions for the right to
dissent as it exists in this society, which may prove to be an impossible

'Boorstin, Making Democracy Work, GURRENT, Jan., 1968, at 27.
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task, it is at 1 ast interesting, if not helpful, to speculate on the causes
of contemporary dissent. In other words, why does it seem that so many
groups of people are now more carefully scrutinizing this world and their
place in it and protesting their conclusions?
Foremost among causes is the fact that this country has a great tradition of dissent. Dissent from the English rule was the basis for the Declaration of Indelndence in 1776. It was only natural, therefore, that the
right to dissent-the right "to petition the Government for a redress of
grievances' '-should be written into the Constitution. Since that document
was executed, countless individuals have distinguished or discredited
themselves by dissenting from the majority for what those individuals
believed to be valid reasons.
It has been suggested, however, that contemporary dissent, involving
the multitudes as it does, is rooted specifically in the conditions which
industrialism has imposed on our culture. There is a tendency in industrialism to substitute impersonal relations for personal ones.
The human being needs organization and technology, to be sure;
but both tend to become ends in themselves, to be idols which men,
for a time, worship. When this tendency is pushed beyond a certain
point, however, human personality can accept it no longer: there
is a rejection of idolatry and an effort to overcome alienation.!
Less profound, but perhaps another valid observation is the following:
We are an affluent society. For the first time in our national history
we are not preoccupied with the striving for bread and a roof over
our heads. Horatio Alger morality has vanished like smoke in a
high wind because there is no more need for people to discipline
their lives in order to avoid misery and poverty. The welfare state
has removed the necessity. Not having to concern ourselves with
our own future, we can afford time to worry about other things,
like the busy mother who postponed her nervous breakdown until
all the children left home because up to that moment she had had
no time for it.'
Whatever the source of modern dissent, it is certain that limits must
be imposed. These limits must not unduly hamper free expression, but
must protect the rights of the non-dissenters, that is, the majority. In our
society we have entrusted the courts with the job of striking the balance
between the government's right to protect its citizens and itself, and the
individual's right to dissent. Neither right is absolute. Both rights have
their source in the Constitution.
The Supreme Court of the United States is the body which ultimately
interprets the Constitution, so the most accurate, if not complete, exposition of the rights of the government versus the rights of the individual
can be found in the opinions of that Court.
Initially, we begin with the fundamental principle that all persons

'Sibley, Anonymity, Dissent, and Individual Integrity in America, ANNALs OF THE
AMERICAN ACADEMY

OF POLITICAL AND SOCIAL

SCIENCE,

July, 1968, at 45, 48.
OF THE DAY 525 (1968).

'Dumke, Social Dissent: It Can Be Poison, 34 VITAL SPEECHES
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are beneficiari-s of the constitutional right to express their opinions, even
though their opinions clash with the opinions of those around them. The
grant of this freedom to dissent was a fundamental motive for the inclusion of the freedom of speech clause in the Bill of Rights. Indeed,
free speech may best serve its purpose when it induces conditions of unrest,
creates dissatisfaction with existing conditions, or even stirs people to
anger. 10 This "free trade of ideas", which is encouraged in our free
society, includes the opportunity to persuade to action, and is not limited
to merely describing facts."
But an individual speaking out against the masses is a voice crying
in the wilderness and may lack significance as an instrument of change.
Consequently, the right to dissent must and does extend to associations of
individuals through the constitutional freedom to assemble. The result is
that peaceful expression by peaceful assembly cannot generally be barred.12
At the opposite end of the spectrum from the individuals and associations of individuals with their right to dissent, is the government or state
with its purpose of insuring order and cohesion among this collection of
individuals wi'hout unduly discriminating in its treatment of any. This
purpose, which amounts to a duty, to insure order comes from the fact
that governments like ours were formed to substitute the rule of law for
the rule of lawlessness and force. 13 In all the areas in which we have
permitted or demanded that the state assume a function, there arises a
legitimate concern on the part of the state that execution of this function
not be disrupt-d or prevented by the dissident and disenchanted. As an
elementary example, when mass demonstrations, by themselves peaceful,
obstruct the free passage of traffic, the state has a legitimate public concern in regulating such demonstrations because it has been given the duty
to regulate traffic. 14 Similarly, the principle of freedom of speech does not
sanction incitement to riot, the classic example being Justice Holmes'
observation that the First Amendment does not justify a false cry of
"fire" in a crowded theatre. 15
Not surprisingly, the state has at times been too enthusiastic in its
attempts to protect the bulk of the population. In most cases this overzealousness can be excused as honest misinterpretation of its roll as a
sovereign. In a few cases it must undoubtedly be attributed to an intentional perpetration of oppressive action against some individual or minority group.' As a safeguard from infringement on constitutional freedoms
by state action, the Supreme Court has, in the course of history, created

"Terminiello v. Chicago, 337 U.S. 1, 4-5 (1949).
'Thomas v. Collins, 323 U.S. 516, 537 (1945).

"Edwards v. South Carolinia, 372 U.S. 229 (1963).
"Brown v. Louisiana, 383 U.S. 131 (1966) (dissenting opinion of J. Black).
"4Shuttlesworth v. City of Birmingham, Ala., 394 U.S. 147, 152 (1969).
"Schenck, supra note 5.

'0 Zwicker v. Boll, 391 U.S. 353, 354 (1967) (dissenting opinion of J. Douglas).
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with which state regulation must

"Vague" is a term which the Court has applied to many attempts of
the state to regulate conduct when the standard of regulation is unduly
obscure and "men of common intelligence must necessarily guess at its
meaning and differ as to its application". 17 A related term used by the
Court to describe improper state regulation is the "overbreadth" of any
particular statute or rule. Overbreadth refers to the principle that "a
governmental purpose to control or prevent activities constitutionally
subject to state regulation may not be achieved by means which sweep
unnecessarily broadly and thereby invade the areas of protected freedoms" i s The danger to constitutional freedoms from such vague or overbroad controls is due to the unfettered discretion which they place in the
hands of local officials. 19 It is, after all, at the local level where the immediate regulation of specific instances of dissent occurs.
The hostility and apprehension toward vagueness is so great that a
statute or rule may be found void and a conviction reversed, if the statute
of conduct could
or rule is found vague, even though the particular course
20
have been prevented under a more reasonable statute.
Whatever the activity to be regulated, the solution is for the state
to supply precise standards in the laws and rules it uses for regulation.
"An order issued in the area of First Amendment rights must be couched
in the narrowest terms that will accomplish the pin-pointed objective permitted by constitutional mandate and the essential needs of the public
order".21 Not only is fair notice given of what conduct is forbidden, but
local officials are also in a position to know whether particular behavior
is lawful or not. Exactly what conduct can be regulated is determined
largely by tra-lition and social necessity, but the state may not suppress
free communication of opinion under the guise of preserving merely
'desirable

conditions

.22

Particularly subject to suspicion is any state regulation on expression
which takes the form of a prior restraint. 23 This is so because broad
prophylactic restraints on expression cut at the very foundation of any
system of freedom of expression. Elimination of such restraints was a
"leading purpose" for the adoption of the First Amendment. 24 The
Supreme Court has never, however, gone so far as to hold prior restraint
on expression to be per se unconstitutional, and any suggestion of such a

"Connally v. General Constr. Co., 269 U.S. 385, 391 (1926).
'8Zwickler v. Koota, 389 U.S. 241, 250 (1967).
"9Cox v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 536, 557 (1965).
1N .A.A.C.P. v. Button, 371 U.S. 415, 432 (1963).
"Carroll v. Presidents & Comm'rs of Princess Anne, 393 U.S. 175, 183 (1968).
OCantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 308 (1940).
"Carroll, supra note 21 at 181.
2Schenck, supra note 5.

-
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concept arouses uncharitable opposition In Edwards v. South Carolina,25
the Court reversed the convictions of 187 demonstrators who had marched
to protest "the present condition of discrimnatory actions against
Negroes" in Columbia, South Carolina. The demonstrators had been convicted of the common-law crime of breach of the peace, but the majority
of the Court felt that there was not even a "clear and present danger"
that the peace would be breached. Former Justice Clark, however, relying
on evidence that the group had been aroused to a "fever pitch", felt that
the police werc correct in curtailing the demonstration.
[T]o say that the police may not intervene until the riot has
occurred is like keeping out the doctor until the patient dies. I
cannot subscribe to such a doctrine.'
Clearly, the manner in which regulation by the state is applied may
mean the difference between constitutional and unconstitutional-permissible and impermissible-regulation. The manner in which dissent is expressed is also a critical factor in the extent to which dissent can be permitted. Dissent in the form of "pure" speech must be more carefully
protected than dissent which involves "nonspeech" elements. The more
closely protest takes the form of "pure" speech, therefore, the more
comprehensive the protection under the First Amendment. 27 Even "pure"
speech does net receive absolute protection, however, and, as indicated
earlier, no one would be justified in yelling "fire" in a crowded auditorium, 28 even if the cry was intended as an objection to the program or

speaker within the auditorium. The Supreme Court has never challenged
the principle that there are special, though limited, circumstances in which
even pure speech is "so interlaced with burgeoning violence" that it
does not and cannot enjoy protection under the guise of being an exercise
of the right to free speech.29 As in most areas of constitutional law, pure
speech is not a "black and white" concept, but is a matter of degree. The
30
fact that words are intended to provoke others to fight may be relevant,
but the mere fact that critics of those dissenting may react with disorder
or violence aga;nst the dissenters is not sufficient to deny the exercise of
31
freedom of opinion.
"Symbolic" speech is apt to be subject to closer scrutiny than pure
speech. Marching on public thoroughfares, chanting or singing in public
places, and the wearing of armbands are forms of symbolic speech. The
distribution of pamphlets and handbills may be another form, but this
type of activity is so near to being pure speech and so historic a weapon

mEdwards, supra note 12.
11Id. at 244 (disenting opinion of J. Clark).
mTinker v. Des Moines Independent Community School District, 393 U.S. 503, 505
(1969).
Schenck, supra note 5.
"Carroll, supra note 21 at 180.
I'See
Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568 (1942).
81
Brown v. Louisiana, supra note 13 at 133, n. 1.
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in the expression of opinion that it is guarded almost as closely as pure
32
speech itself.
The wearing of black armbands in Des Moines, Iowa schools caused
quite a sensation on December 16, 1965. At least three students wearing
the bands, now a common symbol to protest this nation's involvement in
Vietnam, were suspended from school until they would return without
their armbands A complaint was filed by the students, through their
fathers, in United States District Court praying for an injunction against
the disciplinary action. Dismissal of the complaint by the District Court
was affirmed by the equally divided Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals
33
sitting en banc.
Although the controversy had only minor immediate consequence
because the stirdents did not intend to. and did not, wear the armbands
after January 1, 1966, the Supreme Court granted certiorari and issued
one of its most recent and more enlightening opinions on the permissible
restraints on symbolic speech. The District Court's dismissal of the com34
plaint was reversed by a seven to two majority.
The method in which the Court examined and ruled on the alleged
intrusion on constitutional freedoms was a "two-step" method which the
Court has now used many times. 3 5 First, the Court determined whether
or not the wet'ring of armbands was within the sphere of protection afforded by the First Amendment free speech clause. In fact, the Court
found that the wearing of armbands in a manner entirely divorced from
actual or potential disruptive conduct, was "closely akin to 'pure speech' ".
Second, having determined that the activity was included within the
meaning of "free speech", the Court considered the extent to which the
state could regnlate such activity and whether the state had overextended
its regulatory function. It had.
Besides bicng an excellent example of the application of First Amendment freedoms to individual expression, the case, significantly, called
attention to the fact that students are to be considered "persons" under
the Constitution's grants of freedom of opinion. "They are possessed of
just as they themselves
fundamental rights which the State must respect,
36
must respect tl:eir obligations to the State.'
Justices Black and Harlan dissented. Justice Black did not deny that
the wearing of armbands for the purpose of conveying political ideas is
protected by the First Amendment, but did believe that the record showed
that the students' armbands "took the students' minds off their classwork
8'Talley v. California, 362 U.S. 60 (1960).
T
Tinker v. Des Moines Independent Community School District, S.D. Iowa, 258 F.
Supp. 971 (1966), aff'd, 383 F.2d 988 (8 Cir. 1967).
UTinker, supra note 27.

5See, e.g., N.A.A.C.P. v. Button, supra note 20; Bates v. Little Rock, 361 U.S. 516
(1960).

5Edwards, supra note 12 at 511.
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and diverted them to thoughts about the highly emotional subject of the
Vietnam War"'. Justice Harlan was further from the majority's view
when he stated that he believed school officials should be accorded the
"widest authority" in maintaining discipline in the schools. He found
nothing in the record which impugned the good faith of the school officials
37
in promulgating the armband regulation.
Through the years the Supreme Court as well as all other courts in
the United States has provided guidelines for state regulation and individual freedom o£ expression. But regardless of the extent to which dissent is
permitted under the law, there are persons and groups who are not content
to stay withir that legal framework and who commit acts of civil disobedience. Unlawful dissent is not a neat little entity which can be condemned or labe] hostile to the nation's interests. It is a form of dissent
which deserves the study and the examination which is being given it today. The following comment of Joseph J. Casper, Assistant Director of
the F.B.I., summarizes the feeling of too many millions of Americans
today, and is painfully lacking in a real attempt to comprehend what is
occurring in our society today:
The safety of our nation is threatened. Our society is jeopardized
by unlawful conduct bordering on rebellion and anarchy-conduct
which is a direct outgrowth of an absurd theory called civil disobedience.'

There is no doubt that many of the episodes of violent protest which
rate newspaper headlines and television specials justifiably create alarm in
most people. Dissent which causes damage to person or property can
hardly be acceptable in this society no matter what the program urged
by the dissenters. We have available to us too wide a range of channels
for communication of opinion and for persuasion to permit violence as an
additional means. But it may be that some type of recognition of what is
involved in nonviolent civil disobedience is necessary; at least we may be
a better society for at least having considered it as an alternative to passive
submission.
The definition of civil disobedience by Conrad Lynn, quoted earlier,
is a simple one. Commonly, such qualifications are added as the "open

"To be distinguished from Tinker, is the decision of District Judge Charles Luedke in
Brogan v. Collins, Cause No. 55589, Thirteenth District Court in and for the County
of Yellowstone, Montana, contained in his Opinion and Memoranda filed August 27,
1970. In that case, a Billings high school student wore an "Earth Day" armband
to school, violating an established school district dress code prohibiting non-school
insignia. Judge Luedke, at page 10, contrasted the Billings dress code with the nonarmband rule established in the Des Moines school only two days before the armbands were planned to be worn: "There is a big difference between a situation
where a regulation violated is one adopted upon the spur of the moment to face a
crisis and oppose a particular view, and one developed over the years as a product
of a multitude of experiences and calculated to create and maintain a scibol environment most favorable to the functioning of teacher and student alike.
"The first is a reaction, while the second is a regulation."
"Casper, Call Crime to a Screeching Halt, TRIAL, Oct.-Nov. 1968, at 14.
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willful breaking of a law",39 the "nonviolent violation of a law'

',40

and

4
the violation "by persons actively prepared to take consequences". 1
4
Henry David Thoreau is the modern source of the term. " The Supreme
never considered civil disobedience as a doctrine,
Court has apparently
43

much less as a right.

More and more frequently, writers are suggesting that we have a
positive obligation to disobey unjust laws or laws which are morally
wrong. Such suggestions, if they truly influence people, may do as great a
disservice as those who advocate wholesale condemnation of civil disobedience. It is conceded that everyone has a moral duty to participate
in the social and political arenas; too often people merely observe without
enunciating their ideas. As former Secretary of Health, Education and
Welfare John W. Gardner paraphrased from Camelot: 44"Meanwhile, what
do the reasonable people do? Very little. I'm afraid."
But encouraging persons to violate those laws which they personally
feel are not acceptable to themselves can only be an incitement to chaos.
Persons unjustly aggrieved by rules and laws, especially in our society
today, are generally able to provoke the sympathy of others and thereby
enlist aid to their cause. And responsible citizens should never be dissuaded from working for the rights of persons so aggrieved. It is not
necessary, how.2ver, to go so far as to encourage persons to feel aggrieved.
Condoning any form of civil disobedience involves a number of dangers
of which everyone should be aware. First and foremost of these is that
civil disobedience "tends to encourage a general disrespect for law and
order, particularly among the young' .4 5 Dissent by disobedience suggests
that each citizen has a right to determine for himself which laws should
be obeyed. A second danger is the tendency of civil disobedience to escalate, incite t.)mob rule and result in violence. Efforts to persuade then
become efforts to coerce. Third, the concept of civil disobedience is not
susceptible to principles of general application. Everyone has his own
ideas on which laws are just and which are not. 46 All of these dangers
are related, and they each point out further why it is so necessary that
civil disobedierce be studied.
In a few carefully selected instances, civil disobedience may be an
only alternative. From the moment of its conception, our nation has never
enjoyed a period during which some individuals and minority groups

OMorris, American Society and the Rebirth of Civil Obedience, 54 A.B.A.J.
"McKay, Civil Disobediences: A New Credo?, 2 GA. L. REv. 16, 19 (1967).
"Puner, Civil Disobediences: An Analysis and Rationale, 43 N.Y.U.L. Rv.
' 2Rostow, The Consent of the Governed, 44 VA. Q. Rzv. 513, 524 (1968).
43A Lawyer Looks at Civil Disobedience, address by Lewis F. Powell, Jr.,
ture, Wash. & Lee U., Apr. 16, 1966.
4"Gardner, A Nation Is Never Finished, 53 A.B.A.J. 1009 (1967).
"Civil Disobedience and the Right of Dissent, address by The Honorable
Jameson before Billings, Mont., service clubs, Dec., 1968-Jan., 1969.
"See Van Dusen, Civil Disobedience: Destroyer of Democracy, 55 A.B.A.J.
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have not existed under conditions so oppressive that the only hope for
cure lay in extra-legal conduct. It may be possible to judicially establish
some limited :-ecognition of civil disobedience as a doctrine. Any such
recognition would have to be defined with, at least initially, rigid and
clear limits. Following is a minimal enumeration of considerations for
47
determining whether particular acts of civil disobedience can be justified.
(1)
Theie should be no reasonable alternative to the act of disobedience. Alternatives may include other, more reasonable, acts of civil
disobedience.
(2)

There should not be violence, nor injury to property or person.

(3)
The conduct should be motivated not by an intent to disobey the
law, but by a desire to demonstrate its unconstitutionality.
(4) There should be unconditional submission to arrest and other
legal penalties of disobedience.
(5) There should be a legitimate doubt as to the constitutionality of
the law which is disobeyed.
(6) The conduct should be "direct" civil disobedience. That is,
the law violated should be the law which oppresses. "Indirect" civil disobedience, the breaking of one law to protest another, can less often be
justified.
Such considerations as those numbered above, and undoubtedly there
are many others, will not be in the mind of the person who is about to
dissent by disobeying the law. But with these considerations society should
judge the conduct, and perhaps accordingly mitigate the punishment.
Whatever the best solution may be, it is too premature and too simple to
say that civil disobedience should not be acknowledged.
One possible solution is a liberalization of the law in the area of
declaratory judgments. As the law is now, a federal court cannot determine the constitutionality of a statute unless there is before the court an
actual "case or controversy", and not merely an abstract legal question."
The highest conrt in the land has confirmed that the difference is one of
degree and that it would be difficult, if not impossible, to fashion a precise test to distinguish a "controversy" from an "abstract question '.9
The court itself has suggested that liberalization of the "controversy"
definition may be proper where there are "weighty countervailing poli-

"See generally, Brown, Civil Disobedience, 58 J. PHILOSOPHY 669, 676 (1961); A
FORTAS, CONCERNING DISSENT AND CIViL DISOBEDIENcE 33-38 (Signet Pub. 1968);

Hughes, Civil Disobedience and the Political Question Doctrine, 43 N.Y.U.L. REV. 1, 5
(1968).

For a recent example of the failure of a declaratory judgment action, see

Golden v. Zwiccller, 394 U.S. (1969). There, Zwickler was challenging a New York
statute making it a crime to distribute anonymous literature. The Court rules that
there was no immediate

controversy when

the particular congressional candidate

involved had taken an office as a state Supreme Court Justice.
"Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 187 (1962).
"Evers v. Dwyer, 358 U.S. 202 (1958).
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cies". 50 An increased tendency in this direction may eventually supply
a partial substitute for civil disobedience.
We are fortunate to be living in a society in which protest and dissent have traditionally been used for progressive social change. It is natural for a rapidly changing society to be accompanied by more vocal dissent. A nation which desires to have the benefit of the most rapid and
profitable change, and the most constructive use of dissent, needs to spend
some time examining both. When people resort to violence as a means of
expressing opinion, something is wrong, either with those resorting to
violence or with those who establish the limits for lawful dissent. The
expression by dissenters must be responsible expression. The reaction by
the majority to dissent must be something deeper than cynicism-there
must also be concern. The answer to "What do the reasonable people do?"
must be "Care''.

'United States v. Raines, 362 U.S. 17 (1960).
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